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The levels metaphor is commonly used to describe science, its theories, and the
world. Yet the metaphor means different things in different contexts, inviting equi-
vocation. These distinct applications of the metaphor can be distinguished by the
relata they relate, the relation between levels that they assert, and the rule by
which they locate items at a level. I discuss these many applications of the levels
metaphor with an eye to developing a descriptively adequate account of one par-
ticular application: levels of mechanisms. I argue that this application of the meta-
phor is central to the explanatory practices of the special sciences and defensible
as a metaphysical picture of how phenomena studied in the special sciences are
constituted.
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1 Introduction
The levels  metaphor  is  ubiquitous  in  our  de-
scriptions of science and the world. So simple
and elegant, the metaphor takes an apparently
heterogeneous collection of objects and arranges
them in space from bottom to top. The meta-
phor  works  in  so  many  contexts  because  it
leaves open just what kinds of object are to be
arranged, what distinguishes top from bottom,
and what it means to say that an object is at
some levels and not others. This flexibility ex-
plains  the  metaphor’s  fecundity,  but  it  also
helps to obscure the fact that it is used in many
different ways in many different contexts. 
A survey of kinds of levels drawn from sci-
ence  and  philosophy  would  have  to  include
levels of abstraction (Floridi 2008), aggregation
(Wimsatt 1997),  analysis  (Shepherd 1994;
Churchland &  Sejnowski 1992),  causation and
explanation (Kim 1998), implementation (Marr
1982),  organization  (Churchland &  Sejnowski
1992),  processing  (Craik &  Lockhart 1972),
realization (Gillett 2002), sizes (Wimsatt 1976),
sciences, theories, and explanations (Oppenheim
& Putnam 1958). Many of these familiar applic-
ations of the levels metaphor are distinct from
but  also  clearly  related  to  one  another.  And
when they are related, they often have rather
indirect  and  reticulate  connections.  The  level
metaphors  thus  takes  subtly  different  forms
when applied in neighboring contexts, and this
obscures the extent to which features of one ap-
plication of the metaphor do and do not trans-
fer  from  one  context  to  the  next.  My  first
thesis, then, is that our ways of describing sci-
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ence and the world contain many distinct, legit-
imate applications of the levels metaphor that
are either unrelated or that have only indirect
relations with one another.1 
This  descriptive  pluralism about  the
levels metaphor is directly opposed to elimin-
ativism about levels (Fehr 2004; Machamer &
Sullivan 2001;  Thalos 2013).  The  suggestion
that  we might  be  better  off  abandoning  the
levels metaphor is about as likely to win con-
verts as the suggestion that we should aban-
don metaphors involving weight or spatial in-
clusion. These metaphors are too basic to how
we organize the world to seriously recommend
that  they  could  or  should  be  stricken  from
thought and expression. Yet, descriptive plur-
alism about the levels metaphor is consistent
with  the  thought  that  some  applications  of
the  metaphor  distort  the  structure  of  the
world  or  represent  it  as  having  conceptually
incoherent structures. I discuss some examples
below.  The  central  message  of  this  paper  is
that there can be no single verdict concerning
the  utility  or  conceptual  soundness  of  the
levels  metaphor  simpliciter.  The  metaphor
must be evaluated and used with caution, es-
pecially when it is called on to settle disputes
about the character of science and the meta-
physical structure of the world. 
As some motivation for adopting this pro-
posal,  and  as  a  step  toward  a  more  positive
thesis, I show that we can avoid some simple
confusion  by  separating  the  different  applica-
tions  of  the  metaphor.  To  make  this  case,  I
build slowly toward a particular application of
the metaphor that, as I have argued elsewhere
(Craver 2001,  2007),  is  central to explanatory
practices in neuroscience and across the special
sciences: levels of mechanisms. This application
of the levels metaphor is metaphysically plaus-
ible and, so far as I can tell, more or less innoc-
uous; that is part of its virtue. Yet this simple
and useful application of the metaphor can be-
gin to appear problematic when it is inappropri-
ately  assimilated  to  other  applications  that
1 Standard etymologies trace the term “level” to the balance and
from there to the idea of a flat, horizontal landing, as in the stor-
ies of a building. From there, it is easy to see how the metaphor
might be extended to the kinds of hierarchy discussed in this pa-
per. 
serve altogether different purposes in our think-
ing about science and the world. 
My point is not to defend levels of mech-
anisms as the one true application of the levels
metaphor (that would be as pointless as elimin-
ativism).  Rather,  my  first  positive  goal  is  to
provide a reasonably clear account of levels of
mechanisms and to show that this application is
metaphysically benign yet exceptionally import-
ant for doing science. Levels of mechanisms are,
as would be expected, richly but indirectly con-
nected  with  many  other  applications  of  the
metaphor. My second goal is to highlight and
disentangle  some  of  the  confusions  that  arise
from failing to keep levels of  mechanisms dis-
tinct from other senses of levels. In particular, I
show that commitment to the existence of levels
of  mechanisms  entails  no  commitment  to:  a)
monolithic levels in nature, b) the stratification
of sciences by levels, or c) a tidy hierarchy of
theories  among the  sciences.  I  will  also  show
why levels of mechanisms are d) distinct from
Marr’s views about levels of abstraction and e)
distinct  from levels  of  realization  more gener-
ally. I argue that f) the idea of interlevel causa-
tion  is  conceptually  awkward  within  levels  of
mechanisms (but not to levels of  size,  for ex-
ample).  Furthermore,  g)  the  idea  of  levels  of
mechanisms nicely expresses the idea of emer-
gence  as  a  kind  of  non-aggregativity  while
providing no support to those who seek evid-
ence in biology for a more robust kind of emer-
gence.  The  failure  to  disambiguate  altogether
separate applications of the levels metaphor cre-
ates  a  conceptual  malaise  for  which  levels  of
mechanisms are at least a partial cure. 
2 Refining the levels metaphor: Three 
defining questions
In its barest of forms, the levels metaphor de-
mands little of its object; it requires only a set
of items and some criterion for ranking them as
higher or lower than one another in some re-
spect. Seniors are at a higher level in the Amer-
ican high school system than juniors, poetry is
at  a  higher  level  than  pushpin,  lust  is  at  a
higher (and lower) level than like, and cells are
at a higher level than molecules. In these ex-
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amples,  it  is  obvious  that  different  kinds  of
thing are related by entirely distinct kinds of re-
lation. In subtler cases, the equivocation is less
noticeable, and for that, all the more mislead-
ing. 
Three  defining  questions  can  be  used to
explicate how the levels metaphor is applied in
a given context:
The Relata Question: What kinds of item
are being sorted into levels? 
The Relations Question: In virtue of what
are two items at different levels?
The Placement Question: In virtue of what
are two items at the same level?
The Relata Question provides an import-
ant clue about the intended sense of levels. The
flexibility of the metaphor allows it to be ap-
plied to abstracta, such as branches of mathem-
atics and ethical principles, or to concreta, such
as astronomical objects and stereo equipment.
The metaphor can be applied to types, such as
sergeants and corporals, or to tokens, such as
the  relationship  between  Colonel  Blake  and
Corporal O’Reilly. It can be applied to objects
such as cats and mountains, to activities such as
releasing  neurotransmitters  and  making  de-
cisions, and to properties such as excitability or
charge.  Within  the  neurosciences,  the  levels
metaphor is applied fluidly to causes, descrip-
tions,  developmental  stages,  events,  explana-
tions, scientific fields, objects, properties, tech-
niques, and theories. Confusion arises when we
assume that each application is the same. 
The Relations  Question concerns  the  or-
dering relationship by which items are said to
be at a higher or a lower level than one another.
A theory, for example, might be said to be at a
higher level than a second if the first is deriv-
able from the second (and not vice versa); the
lowest-level  theories  are  in  this  sense  “funda-
mental.” Poetry might be said to be higher than
pushpin in the sense that it requires greater in-
tellectual skill and training to take pleasure in
the former than to take pleasure in the latter. A
technique might be said to be at a lower level
than another because it detects phenomena at a
smaller  size  scale.  Some  applications  of  the
levels metaphor are discrete in the sense that
there is a gap between things at lower and high
levels;  other  applications  are  continuous,  as
when one uses  the metaphor to describe size.
We are unlikely to confuse such wildly different
kinds of relationship. However, as we will see,
the metaphor is used in other contexts where it
is  beguilingly  difficult  to  keep  them  distinct,
even for those who know better. 
The Placement Question asks for the prin-
ciple by which different items are located on the
same level.  Many uses  of  the levels  metaphor
rely  at  heart  on  an  answer  to  the  placement
question.  When  the  metaphor  is  used  to  de-
scribe size scales, for example, puffins and por-
cupines  are  at  roughly  the  same  level,  vaso-
pressin and oxytocin are at roughly the same
level, and hydrogen and oxygen atoms are to-
gether at a lower level still. Juniors are all juni-
ors  because  they  are  in  their  third  year  of
American high school. For Marr, computational
level questions are directed at what is computed
and why it is computed that way (Shagrir 2010;
Bechtel & Shagrir 2013).2 Not every account of
levels requires an answer to the placement ques-
tion affirmatively.  Indeed,  it  is  of  central  im-
portance that the idea of levels of mechanisms
articulated here entails no positive story about
what it means to be at a level, only a negative
story  about  when  things  are  not  at  different
levels.
3 From gesture to prototype
Perhaps  the  most  common application  of  the
levels metaphor is to gesture loosely at the rela-
tionship between different fields of scientific re-
search,  levels  of  science.3 In  neuroscience,  for
example, some researchers work at “the molecu-
lar level,” doing things such as sequencing chan-
nel proteins, studying enzyme kinetics, or ma-
nipulating  genes.  Others  work  at  the  cellular
level, doing things such as staining cells, record-
ing action potentials, or studying neural migra-
tion. Others study brain regions, characterizing
2 One consequence of the following discussion is that not every account
of  levels  must  offer  a  unique  answer  to  the  placement  question.
Levels of mechanisms are defined by their distinctive relata and rela-
tions; these constraints, by themselves, offer no unique answer to the
placement question. This is why levels of mechanisms are, as I will
argue, local rather than monolithic.
3 For the relevant sense  of  a scientific  “field”,  see  Darden &  Maul
(1977) and Darden (1992).
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their  anatomical  features  or,  studying  the
propagation of neural signals within them. Still
others work at the level of systems, using func-
tional  magnetic  resonance  imaging  (fMRI),
transcranial  magnetic  stimulation  (TMS),  and
cognitive tasks to find large-scale cognitive sys-
tems in the mind-brain. One could perhaps in-
sinuate  other  levels  between  these,  and  one
could  certainly  extend  the  hierarchy  further
down or higher up. But the central idea is that
the scientific fields can be ordered as higher or
lower than one another.
Scientific fields are individuated in part by
their theories (Darden 1992). The gestural sense
of levels, then, can seem to carry the implica-
tion that scientific theories are or will someday
be ordered more or less clearly into levels.  Op-
penheim & Putnam’s (1958) influential view of
the unity of science is based on a rough corres-
pondence between levels of science, levels of the-
ory, and levels of parts and wholes (see Table
1).  They divide the world into six ontological
strata  (societies,  organisms,  cells,  molecules,
atoms, and elementary particles). These strata
are defined by mereological relationships among
types:  elementary  particles  are  the  parts  of
atoms,  atoms are the parts of  molecules,  mo-
lecules  are parts  of  cells,  and so on.  Each of
these strata is assigned a distinct science: eco-
nomics  and  the  social  sciences  at  the  top,
particle physics at the bottom. Each science de-
velops  its  theory  more  or  less  autonomously
from the others,  so the theories developed by
these sciences can themselves be ordered,  like
the layers of a cake, from top to bottom. The
unity of science, for Oppenheim and Putnam, is
to be achieved by explaining phenomena in the
domain of a higher-level science, as described in
the theory of that science, in terms of the items
in the domain of the more fundamental science,
as  described  in  the  theories  of  that  science.
(Levels of mechanisms, as defined below, involve
a  kind  of  part-whole  relation  as  well  but
without any commitment to the idea that such
type-level  part-whole  relationships  correspond
in even a rough way to the structure of the sci-
ences or to the structures of their theories.)
Wimsatt’s detailed and influential explora-
tion  of  the  levels  metaphor  confronts  Oppen-
heim and Putnam with the complexity of the
levels found in many areas of contemporary sci-
ence (Wimsatt 1976). Against Oppenheim and
Putnam’s  six-layer  model,  Wimsatt’s  “Reduc-
tionist  Illustrative”  (Figure  1) represents  mul-
tiple  branches  of  levels  fanning  out  from the
lowest level in subatomic particles to cosmolo-
gical objects, the sociocultural world (e.g., eco-
nomic  and  political  phenomena),  and  the  so-
cioecological world (e.g., evolution).
Wimsatt’s tree diagram, however,  repres-
ents only one aspect of his prototype account of
levels  that  encompasses  many  more  features
than Oppenheim and Putnam’s layer-cake map-
ping in Table 1. The core features in Wimsatt’s
prototype are:
• Size. Higher-level  items  are  larger  than
lower-level items. 
• Composition. Higher-level  items are made
up of lower-level objects and processes. 
• Laws. Laws of nature hold only or mostly
between items at the same level.
• Forces. Distinct  forces  operate at  different
levels. 
• Predictability.  Levels are local maxima of
regularity and predictability that appear at
different size scales.
• Detection. Items at a given level tend to be
detected  or  detectable  primarily  by  other
items at that level. 
• Causes.  Causal  relationships  hold  only  or
mostly between items at the same level. 
• Theories.  Scientific  theories  describe  phe-
nomena  exclusively  or  mostly  at  a  single
level. 
• Techniques. Different  techniques  and  in-
struments detect items at different levels.
• Disciplines.  Different disciplines  of  science
direct their attention at different levels.
Wimsatt’s view is a prototype view in the sense
that  it  characterizes  the  levels  metaphor  in
terms of a core set of features, not all of which
must be present in order for the metaphor to
apply. Insofar as Wimsatt embraces a prototype
model, he can be seen as embracing descriptive
pluralism while, at the same time, holding that
there is a sufficiently strong family resemblance
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among the plurality of applications of the levels
metaphor to warrant their inclusion in a single
prototype.
Is the levels metaphor sufficiently unified
across these different applications to warrant a
single prototype? My remarks on the relata, re-
lation, and placement questions should already
indicate that it is not—that different features in
Wimsatt’s list are at best indirectly related and
so fail to map to one another in any tidy way.
While  the  prototype  approach  usefully  high-
lights the complexity of the levels metaphor, it
also obscures the extent to which the different
features in the prototype are features of differ-
ent applications of that metaphor.4 
4 Wimsatt’s  diagram  in  Figure  1 reflects  this.  The  branching  tree
structure is  ordered by compositional relations. Wimsatt’s view of
levels as dissipating waves (see Figure 3 below) flouts that relation. 
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4 Levels of sciences and theories
Wimsatt, Oppenheim, and Putnam all include
within their analysis of levels the gestural idea
that different fields or disciplines of science are
arranged by the sizes of the objects they study.
Wimsatt’s branching hierarchies depict a more
ornate  structure.  Within  that  structure,  it
seems inappropriate to say that astrophysics is
at  a  higher  level  than  biology  or  economics,
though astrophysicists typically deal with things
that  are  orders  of  magnitude larger  than the
things biologists and economists study. The ges-
tural sense of levels doesn’t seem to branch that
way. 
When we apply  the  levels  metaphor  to
sciences,  the relata are units of scientific or-
ganization (such as fields, research programs,
or  disciplines).  Answers  to the  relations  and
placement questions are more difficult to dis-
cern and are likely impossible to express both
accurately and concisely for  this  application.
Size  seems to  be  relevant,  but  we have  just
seen that  it  cannot be the whole story.  The
branches in Wimsatt’s diagram follow, in ad-
dition  to  size  relationships,  relationships  of
composition.  The  things  studied  by  econom-
ists  (groups)  are composed of  things studied
by psychologists (organisms), which are com-
posed  of  things  studied  by  physiologists
(physiological systems), and so on. The things
studied by Darwin are composed of the things
studied by zoologists, which are composed of
the things studied by cytologists. The point of
these examples is not to get the branches in
Wimsatt’s  hierarchy  exactly  right;  any  pro-
posed hierarchy of the sciences and the items
in  their  domains  is  bound to  be  historically
contingent and provisional at best. 
In fact, many sciences appear to resist tidy
compartmentalization  within  levels.  Neuros-
cience,  especially  cognitive  neuroscience,  is  a
paradigm  of  multilevel  science,  encompassing
the study of  ions,  ion channels,  cells,  popula-
tions of  cells,  brain  regions,  and behaviors  of
whole  organisms.  No  competent  evolutionary
biologist  can  avoid  knowing  something  about
genes, physiological systems, organisms, popula-
tions,  and  environments.  Many  sciences,  in
short,  contain items within their domain that
stand in compositional relations to one another.
Such sciences often construct multilevel theories
that integrate findings across multiple levels of
organization. This is one reason why the rela-
tionship  between  levels  of  science  and  part-
whole levels is indirect. 
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Another  reason  is  that,  in  many  cases,
more than one science is dedicated to studying
items  at  the  same  mereological  or  size  level.
Cytologists, anatomists, and electrophysiologists
all  study aspects  of  cells  with  different  tools.
The ethologist and the experimental psycholo-
gist study animal behavior, but they approach
that behavior with different assumptions, meth-
ods,  and  theories.  Economists,  ecologists,  epi-
demiologists,  and  organizational  psychologists
study populations  of  organisms.  The relation-
ship between levels of science and the ontolo-
gical levels that Oppenheim and Putnam pre-
sume is many to many. 
For this reason, it is unlikely that any pre-
cise answer to the placement question will cor-
rectly express the application of the levels meta-
phor to sciences. One might say that two sci-
ences are on the same level when they pertain
to items at the same compositional level. Per-
haps it makes sense to say that Camillo Golgi
was  investigating  the  same  level  when  he
stained  Purkinje  cells  with  silver  nitrate  that
Alan Hodgkin was investigating when he used
his voltage clamp to study the action potential
of the squid giant axon. They were both study-
ing cells, but they studied different phenomena
and used different techniques. If we focus now
on the parts of these wholes, we see that these
different  scientists  are  not  even  on  the  same
branches of a Wimsatt diagram, and the levels
metaphor  begins  to  break  down.  Ask  Golgi
about the relevant parts of the cell, and he will
tell you about its gross morphological features
and its organs. Ask Hodgkin and Huxley about
the relevant parts of the squid giant axon, and
they will tell you about membranes, axon hil-
locks, ionic conductances, and voltage gradients.
An epidemiologist might talk about nodes and
networks  and  hubs  in  a  model  of  contagion.
Economists will talk about producers and con-
sumers.  Differences in scientific interests often
entail  differences  in  the  relevant  ontology  for
the science; and the same thing can be carved
into parts in many ways depending on what one
is interested in describing or explaining (Kauff-
man 1971; Wimsatt 1972). 
The take-home lesson:  the application of
the levels metaphor to fields of science yields a
notion of levels only indirectly related to ontolo-
gical levels (as understood in a roughly compos-
itional,  part-whole  sense).  The  idealized,  Op-
penheim-Putnam correspondence between levels
of science, levels of theory, and levels of mere-
ology  breaks  down in  the  face  of  this  many-
many mapping. And the compositional  aspect
in  Wimsatt’s  prototype  appears  to  be  only
loosely related to the application of the levels
metaphor  to  fields  of  science.  These  are,  in
short, distinct applications of the metaphor, of-
fering different answers to the relata, relations,
and placement questions. As a result, an under-
standing  of  how  sciences  can  be  organized
loosely into levels provides no direct insight into
ontological levels. This will come as no surprise
to  those  who study intellectual  history,  or  to
those  who have witnessed for  themselves how
fields  of  science  change  their  boundaries  over
time. Our age, perhaps more than any other,
has  witnessed  an  explosion  of  hybrid  fields
(neuroeconomics, behavioral genetics, cognitive
ethology) that cross levels, combine approaches,
and attempt to feed off insights shared between
distant  scientific  neighbors.  The  historical  re-
lativity of disciplinary boundaries makes them
unreliable guides to ontology. 
The  same  considerations  suggest  that
levels  of  scientific  theory will  also  have  a
many-many  relationship  with  ontological
levels. In this application of the metaphor, the
relata  are  theories  or  models.  And the  rela-
tionship  is  typically  construed  as  a  kind  of
subsumption,  e.g.,  deductive  subsumption
(Hempel 1965;  Schaffner 1993;  Kitcher 1989),
or some kind of similarity or inclusion (Bickle
1998).  The  disciplinary  hodgepodge  of  the
special sciences fails to match this philosoph-
ical  reconstruction.  Single  theories,  such  as
the theory explaining spatial memory in terms
of  memory  systems,  grid  cell  organization,
synaptic plasticity, and changes in ionic con-
ductances  through  a  membrane  (see  Moser
2008), often reach across many different part-
whole  levels  (Darden &  Maul 1977;  Bechtel
1988;  Craver 2002,  2008). One and the same
mereological  unit  (e.g.,  cells)  can  appear  in
many  distinct  theories  (e.g.,  neurons  play
some role in most theories in neuroscience). 
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The multilevel structure of contemporary
science emphasized in nearly every corner of the
special sciences is not best understood as a hier-
archy of theories. Nor is it a hierarchy of fields.
Instead, there is an ontological hierarchy work-
ing behind the scenes. This background ontolo-
gical assumption guides the development of the-
ories, informs the criteria for evaluating explan-
ations,  and  underlies  the  roughly  hewn  idea
that  sciences  and  theories  are  organized  into
levels. It is the expression of an ideal of explan-
ation to understand how things work in terms
of  their  component  parts  and  to  understand
how those  parts  work in  terms of  still  lower-
level  components.  It  is  precisely  because  the
world is presumed to have this kind of multi-
level structure, of mechanisms within mechan-
isms, that the sciences investigating that world
and the theories describing it are so reticulate
that  they can look like the “bio-psychological
thicket” on the right side of Wimsatt’s tree. In
the  thicket,  the  orderly  relationship  among
levels breaks down and is replaced by a jumble.
The image makes it hard to see any meaningful
sense  in  which  distinct  items  are  at  different
levels. Perhaps this thought fuels eliminativism
about levels. 
The  biological  sciences  are  undeniably
thicket-like. But this sociological fact is only in-
directly related to the ontic structures presumed
to lie behind and scaffold the development of
these theories. From now on, then, I focus on
applications of the levels metaphor to the world,
not to sciences or theories. 
5 Size levels 
One ontological application of the levels meta-
phor emphasizes the relative sizes of objects at
different levels. The relata in size levels are ob-
jects or kinds of object, and the interlevel rela-
tionship is relative size (larger, smaller). Things
in the same size range are at the same level.
Churchland and Sejnowski’s classic diagram of
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levels in the neurosciences (Figure 2) is accom-
panied  by  size  scales  for  each  level,  ranging
from Angstrom units to meters.5 
As noted above,  Wimsatt’s  tree diagram
branches precisely because it is tracking some-
thing stronger than size: some kind of composi-
tional relation. In a second diagram (Figure 3),
Wimsatt  emphasizes  size  and  abandons  the
compositional relationship implicit in Figure  1.
The abscissa in Figure  3 represents a roughly
logarithmic size scale, and yet the figure is not
compositional.  Large  metazoan  organisms  are
not generally composed of smaller metazoan or-
ganisms,  and it  would  surely  be  a  stretch  to
claim that these two are generally composed of
unicellular  organisms  (though  there  might  be
some truth in that claim). The ordinate in this
diagram is a measure of regularity and predict-
ability. The figure is repeated three times, each
5 One might, analogously, arrange a hierarchy of activities, with differ-
ent  activities  occurring  on  different  temporal  scales.  The  idea  of
levels of mechanisms combines these two ideas; it is a hierarchy of
doings  framed by a relevance relationship between those  at lower
levels and those at higher levels. 
illustrating a different way the world might be
organized with respect to size. At the top is an
orderly world (despite impending doom on the
right).  Objects  become more regular  and pre-
dictable in their behavior, and to the same de-
gree,  at  certain  size  scales.  Beneath  this  is  a
world  with  no  sharp  peaks  of  regularity  and
predictability. As Wimsatt notes, scientists con-
fronted by such a world might question whether
they have chosen the right  variables  for  their
models. On the bottom is Wimsatt’s conjecture
for our world, where regularity is very high for
single  atoms but falls  off  at larger or smaller
scales. This wave dissipates over time, peaking
lower and spreading out over larger and larger
size  ranges  as  scale  increases.  Wimsatt’s  dia-
gram  thus  represents  an  empirical  hypothesis
about  how  levels,  as  peaks  of  regularity  and
predictability, are in fact distributed across dif-
ferent size scales in our world. If his empirical
hypothesis is correct, it calls out for explanation
that our world is more like the first and third
graphs than it is like the second. 
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Why does Wimsatt represent size as the
determining factor in regularity and predictabil-
ity? The answer turns on other features in his
prototype account. For example, things of dif-
ferent sizes effect and are affected by different
forces, and objects of different sizes act and in-
teract with one another more than they interact
with objects at other levels. Market forces run
economies, cosmic objects move under gravita-
tional  forces,  and  hydrogen  bonds  hold  mo-
lecules  together.  Regularity  and  predictability
peak at different size scales because the forces
act and the causal relationships occur mostly at
those size scales. 
Wimsatt’s  empirical  hypothesis  has  not
been  tested.6 Despite  its  intuitive  appeal,  one
can readily produce examples of causes, forces,
and laws that operate promiscuously across  a
very wide range of size scales. Big things (even
very  big  things)  and  little  things  (even  very
little things) routinely interact, as when planets
attract molecules into atmospheres or when a
five-millimeter  louse  attaches  itself  to  a  thir-
teen-meter gray whale. Forces also act at many
scales. Gravitation affects the human species on
an evolutionary scale just as much as it influ-
ences individual human actions and the otoliths
in our vestibular system. The very existence of
interlevel theories, bridging molecules to behavi-
ors (for example), provides ample evidence that
regularity  and  predictability  often  span  size
scales: facts about gasses can be predicted from
facts about molecules, and facts about learning
can be inferred from facts about molecules. 
If we could find a way to test Wimsatt’s
hypothesis,  it  might  turn  out  that  causes,
forces, and laws do tend to cluster around cer-
tain size scales. This would be a striking empir-
ical fact about the world and would, again, call
out for some kind of explanation. In contrast,
Wimsatt raises no principled objections to inter-
level causes, forces, or regularities; he offers an
empirical hypothesis  that  interlevel  causes,
forces, and regularities tend to be less prevalent
than those operating at a single level. 
6 It is hard to say how it would be tested and, in particular, how predict-
ability is to be measured. Surely items in the valleys of this diagram are
not unpredictable, full stop. Rather, they are more difficult to predict for
creatures like us, unaided by machines and programs. It is not clear why
human cognitive abilities should have any further ontological significance.
There  are,  however,  apparent  principled,
conceptual difficulties faced by the effort to de-
scribe  levels of realization  in terms of a causal
relation. There are many notions of realization,
often tailored to altogether distinct philosoph-
ical disputes (Craver & Wilson 2007). On most
accounts, however, one and the same object or
event  has  both  the  realized  and the  realizing
property, and the object cannot differ with re-
spect to the realized property without the real-
izing property being different in some way (su-
pervenience).  The  relata  here  are  properties.
The interlevel relationship is or includes super-
venience.7 
Marr’s  levels,  as  I  understand them,  are
levels of realization. The hardware realizes the
algorithm, which, in the right context, realizes
the computation. It is awkward at best to say
that  the  algorithm  causes  the  computation;
rather, the algorithm implements the computa-
tion in context.  Changing context can change
the computation. For example, a subtraction al-
gorithm can implement division; the log of a di-
vision is a difference of logs. Likewise, the func-
tion represented in the algorithm is not caused
by the hardware; the hardware instantiates or
implements  the  algorithm.  Computation-,  al-
gorithm-, and hardware-level theories are all dif-
ferent  ways  of  describing  one  and  the  same
thing—different predicates applied to one and
the same system as a whole in its working con-
text. 
The same holds for what we might call mi-
cro-realization: when some property of a whole
is realized by the organized and interacting col-
lection of parts that constitute the property of
the  whole.  An  early  edition  of  the  Betty
Crocker  Cookbook apparently  contains  an  ex-
planation of how the microwave heats the soup
(Churchland 1995). According to this explana-
tion,  the  molecules  excited  by  the  microwave
rub against one another and heat the soup by
friction. As Churchland points out, Betty mis-
represents the relationship between the heat of
a liquid and the kinetic energy of its constituent
molecules. Temperature is not produced by the
7 Supplemental conditions might be added to make realization more
demanding (e.g., Melnyk 2003; Haug forthcoming). The point I wish
to make doesn’t turn on this matter.
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mean kinetic energy of component molecules in
such  cases;  rather,  temperature  in  such  situ-
ations is constituted or realized by (Churchland
would say identical to) the mean kinetic energy
of the components. In the same way, one might
think that  the behavior  of  a  mechanism as a
whole is realized by, rather than caused by, the
organized  collection  of  its  components.  The
beating of the heart is realized, not caused, by
the  choreographed  movements  of  the  auricles
and ventricles. It is awkward and unnatural to
assert otherwise.
The apparent awkwardness and unnatural-
ness of such ways of talking follows from many
core  principles  that  many  (rightly  or  wrongly)
embrace  about  the  nature  of  causation.  If  one
thinks that causes must precede their effects, and
one understands the realization relationship as a
synchronic relation, then levels of realization can-
not be causally related. If one thinks of causation
in terms of the intersection of processes and the
exchange of marks or conserved quantities, then
the relata in levels of realization do not come to
intersect in space-time (they always and every-
where intersect), they do not carry their marks
beyond the locus of the intersection (because they
always  and everywhere  intersect),  and they do
not pass anything from one to the other. In short,
the intimacy among levels of realization seemingly
precludes any standard metaphor of production,
or “oomph,” or expression of a disposition, or the
exertion of a power. This intimacy stands in the
way of anyone who believes that causes and ef-
fects  must  be altogether  distinct  from one an-
other.8 So indistinct are levels of realization that
many philosophers,  Churchland included,  prefer
to speak of identity in such contexts (see Polger
2006). Finally, if one thinks of causation in terms
of the ability to manipulate effects by intervening
on causes, one will note that there is no way to
intervene  to  change  the  properties  of  wholes
without, at the same time, intervening to change
the supervenience base of those properties.9
8 I discuss a representative quote from Lewis below when considering
causal relations between levels of mechanisms.
9 One can, in cases of multiple realization, intervene into the parts and
their organization without intervening to change the property of the
whole, and this affords some measure of independence. Perhaps one
can find room in this view for the idea of understanding bottom-up
relations in a hierarchy of realization as causal (though, again, realiz-
ation or token identity seem to be better ways of talking). But there
I raise these issues not to cement a case
against the possibility of understanding realiza-
tion  and  causation  so  as  to  leave  conceptual
space for causation between levels of realization.
(For a fuller discussion, see Kim 2000; Craver &
Bechtel 2006). I mention them only to point out
that relations of size and realization have very
different implications for the intelligibility of in-
terlevel  causation.  No  theory  or  principle  of
causation that I know places any metaphysical
restrictions on causal relations among objects of
different  sizes.  Many  theories  or  principles  of
causation appear to rule out the possibility of
causal  relationships  between  levels  of  realiza-
tion. The point is that Wimsatt’s empirical hy-
pothesis that causes, laws, and regularities tend
to be sequestered within size scales is altogether
distinct from the claim that there is no concep-
tual room for causation between levels of realiz-
ation. Interlevel causation is mysterious or not
depending on which views of levels and causa-
tion one adopts.10
6 Parts and wholes
A distinct and indirectly related application of
the  levels  metaphor  in  the  neighborhood  of
is no room in the view (no conceptual room) for causation to work
from the top down in such levels. For a penetrating discussion of this
matter and its implications for causation in a multilevel world, see
Baumgartner 2010, 2013; Romero (forthcoming).
10 Levels of control and levels of processing, in contrast, are defined in terms of
causal relations. In levels of control, the relata are agencies and the relation
is dominance. Items at higher levels direct or regulate the activities of their
underlings. Majors and corporals, queen bees and drones, bosses and work-
ers occupy different levels of a control hierarchy. Analogous relations are
sometimes found among physiological systems. When one speaks of “execut-
ive function” in cognition, one is describing levels of control.  
The idea of control or dominance is a causal notion, and it is independ-
ent of matters of size (witness the sauropod brain). Contra Fehr (2004),
the idea that the world is organized in levels of realization or organiza-
tion (as defined below) is not an expression of patriarchy; it is an equi-
vocation to characterize realization and organization as relations of dom-
inance. In levels of control, the relata are logically independent and spati-
otemporally distinct interactors. It is not at all implausible for one to
control the other causally (more on this below).  
In levels of processing, the relata are processing units of some sort
(such as brain regions or computational modules), and they are re-
lated as “upstream” or “downstream” in the flow of information or
the order of production. In the early visual system (neglecting feed-
back for the moment), one can describe visual information as passing
from lowest- (shallowest-, earliest-) level processing in the retina to
higher-  (deeper-,  later-)  level  processing  in  the  Lateral  geniculate
nucleus (LGN) and the primary visual cortex. Levels of realization
and organization are not earlier or later than one another. Craik and
Lockhart define levels of processing in terms of depth of semantic or
cognitive processing, not in terms of decomposition.
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levels  of  realization invites  a different kind of
equivocation, this time concerning the existence
of higher-level powers. This application involves
not a whole-whole relationship but rather the
relationship between the behavior or property of
a whole and the behaviors or properties of one
of its parts. The behavior of the whole does not
(except in special cases) supervene on the oper-
ation of the individual parts. The grain of sand
contributes to the mass of the sand pile. The
kidney contributes to the capacity of creatures
to maintain plasma osmolality. In each case, the
property of the whole (the mass of the pile, the
regulation  of  plasma  osmolality)  might  differ
even  when  the  contribution  of  these  singular
parts remains the same. In part-whole levels, as
opposed to levels of realization, the relationship
is  between  parts  and  wholes,  not  between
wholes and the corresponding organized collec-
tions  of  entities,  properties,  and activities.  In
this case, eliminativism about levels is  a non-
starter (whatever its metaphysical credentials);
it is impossible to imagine neuroscience, biology
generally,  or  indeed  most  special  sciences
without the idea that things have parts.
In  applying  the  levels  metaphor  to  this
part-whole  relation,  one  emphasizes  the  rela-
tions question over the placement question.11 In
levels of size, things are at a given level because
they are similar in size. Levels, thus conceived,
are  monolithic: they reach across all of nature,
embracing everything within a given size range.
Oppenheim and Putnam’s layered model of the
world  might  be  read  as  similarly  monolithic.
Wimsatt’s tree diagram breaks with this mono-
lithic view precisely because it emphasizes com-
positional  relationships:  different  branching
levels  are  required  because  different  kinds  of
whole  (cosmological  objects,  human  societies)
are composed in different ways. If one centers
part-whole thinking in one’s application of the
levels metaphor, then the metaphor carries no
particularly  useful  answer  to  the  placement
11 I am here using the terms “part” and “whole” in an intuitive
and inclusive way. Much of the literature on the metaphysics of
parthood is  simply  unrelated  to  the  many  senses  of  part  and
whole  used  in  the  theories  of  the  special  sciences.  I  am  not
thinking only of objects or sets, but also about events and tem-
poral units. I sketch a more restrictive kind of part-whole rela-
tion  below,  but  this  remains  an  open  question  (see  Sanford
1993).
question. One can offer only a necessary condi-
tion: two things are at the same level only if
they are  not  related as part  to  whole.  Given
that most things are not related to one another
as  part  to  whole,  the  resulting  idea  of  being
“at” a part-whole level has little or no concep-
tual significance. 
Levels of parts and wholes lack many of
the  features  in  Wimsatt’s  prototype  of  levels.
Many of the features in that prototype appear
to derive from the monolithic conception shown
in Figure  3: causes, forces, and laws are most
plausibly thought to cluster together on the as-
sumption that size is  relevant to which forces
can act, that causal relations are expressions of
forces acting, and that laws govern these inter-
actions. But if one places the part-whole rela-
tion in the center of one’s metaphor, then there
is no reason to embrace an empirical association
between  being  at  a  given  level  and  having  a
proprietary  set  of  causal  interactions  for  that
level. Levels of parts and wholes must also be
correlated  with  size  differences  because  parts
can be no larger than the wholes they compose.
But the size differences between levels of parts
and wholes are an accidental consequence of the
part-whole relationship itself, not part of defin-
ing what it is for things to be at different part-
whole levels. 
In the following subsections, my goal is to
sketch some contours of the relevant notion of
part and whole. I start with classical mereology
only to make the point that this apparatus was
not constructed with an eye to developing a de-
scriptively  adequate  account  of  the  levels  de-
scribed by science. The more we learn about the
limits of these classical models for our present
purposes, the more we place constraints on the
relevant notion of levels that, as I and others
have argued, is central to the explanatory struc-
ture  of  neuroscience  and  the  special  sciences
generally:  levels of  mechanisms (Bechtel 1988;
Bechtel &  Richardson 1993;  Craver 2001;
Machamer et al. 2000). 
6.1 Types and tokens of parts and wholes
The Gibson SG has two humbucker pickups. My
Gibson SG has two humbucker pickups. Not all
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Gibson SG’s have two humbucker pickups. But
that’s the factory model, the central exemplar
or prototype against which variations are evalu-
ated as more or less “typical.” Likewise, when
we talk about the human brain or the frog kid-
ney,  we  are  talking  about  types:  the  human
type of brain, the frog type of kidney. And we
talk also about the parts these types of things
typically have. 
The  monolithic,  layer-cake  image  in  the
Oppenheim-Putnam hierarchy is a mereology of
types: societies are formed of organisms, organ-
isms of cells, cells of molecules, and so on. Wim-
satt’s tree also represents relationships between
types.  Crystals  are  made of  crystalline  solids,
which are made of  inorganic molecules,  which
are made of atoms. It is true, of course, that all
cells are made of molecules and that all organs
are made of cells. But is not true that all cells
are at a higher level than molecules generally.
It seems natural and harmless enough to
treat the part-whole relations among types as
generalizations over relations between particular
wholes  and  particular  parts.  When  one  says,
“The human brain has two hemispheres and a
corpus callosum,” one asserts that having these
parts is typical of human brains. One is warran-
ted on the basis of such a claim (though not al-
ways correct) in asserting of a particular human
brain that it has two hemispheres. That is, the
relation  among  part  and  whole  types derives
from  a  more  primitive,  token  relationship
between particular parts and wholes. Type-level
claims  about  part-whole  relations  assert  that
such part-whole relations regularly or typically
hold in the individuals in the relevant reference
class.
One of the many useful insights contained
implicitly in  the branching structure of  Wim-
satt’s tree diagram (Figure  1) is that different
types of wholes are made up of different types
of parts and are naturally decomposed into dif-
ferent  levels.  Both  the  human  brain  and  the
frog kidney are organs, and both are made of
cells,  but  the  cells  in  each  are  different,  and
these cells are organized differently into higher-
level components. If we look within the human
brain, we find that different brain regions are
composed  of  altogether  different  components
and exhibit more or less proprietary organiza-
tion. Broadman mapped the brain by studying
these  differences  in  cytoarchitecture  from one
brain region to the next. The receptive field or-
ganization of the visual cortex has, to my know-
ledge, no companion in the organization of the
amygdala or of the mammillary bodies. Differ-
ent types of brain regions/systems are made up
of different types of components: they have dif-
ferent part-whole levels.12 
When we say that objects or processes of
one type are parts of objects or processes of an-
other type, we are asserting that ceteris paribus
token objects of the one type are composed of
token objects of the second type. Indeed, stand-
ard attempts to define the part-whole relation-
ship with logical rigor are expressed in terms of
relationships  among  token  individuals  (Varzi
2014).13 
6.2 Mereology
Although  Oppenheim  and  Putnam  describe
the layer-cake structure of science in terms of
different  types  of  objects,  the  mereological
structure they use to support this picture is
expressed in terms of tokens. Classical mere-
ology  provides  a  very  general  and  content-
neutral account of the part relation. It can be
used equally well to express the sense in which
12 Elephant hearts are parts of elephants, and puffin hearts are parts of
puffins, and hearts are parts of organisms. Yet puffin hearts are not
at a lower part-whole level than elephants, and elephant hearts are
not at a lower part-whole level than puffins. 
13 I shall not enter here into the difficult question of how token proper-
ties,  processes,  and objects  are  individuated in  the  biological  sci-
ences. Consider the spatial memory system in a rat. If we take this
to be one thing over the life of the organism, then it will be com-
posed of many different sets of parts over the course of its existence,
like  the  ship of  Theseus.  If  we take  it  instead to  be  the  spatial
memory  system involved  in  learning  the  layout  of  one  particular
maze, which learning might be constituted by multiple trials and ex-
tended investigation, then again we will  have a single higher-level
system composed differently at different time slices. If we focus on a
given instant in time, then no learning can occur; learning is a kind
of change. For now, I simply note (along with  Bechtel &  Mundale
1999) that the appropriate mapping between such parts and wholes
presupposes  a  criterion of  individuation for  the  whole,  and  what
counts or does not count as a part will be determined by whether it
contributes to that whole, however specified. This is related to Mar-
cus’ (2006) thought that any token identity between levels presup-
poses a (non-dummy) sortal that fixes the individuation conditions
of the relata in the same way. Carl Gillett (2013) has called attention
to the need for different accounts of compositional relations for prop-
erties, processes, and objects. Here, I am glossing over these differ-
ences to keep the discussion simple.
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the word apple has the letter “a” as a part, in
which courage has judgment as a part, and in
which apple pie has cinnamon as a part. Com-
mon  axioms  associated  with  classical  mere-
ology,  including  the  mereology  adopted  by
Oppenheim and Putnam (Rescher &  Oppen-
heim 1955), include:
1) Reflexivity: Every object is a part of it-
self.
2) Transitivity: Every part of a part of
an object is part of the object. 
3)  Extensionality:  An  object  is  com-
pletely determined by the set of its parts;
i.e., for objects to be identical, it suffices
that  they  have  all  and  only  the  same
parts.
4) Summation:  Any pair of objects (x,
y),  is  itself  an  object,  z,  which  is  their
sum.
I list these constraints only to illustrate that
classical mereology will take us only so far in
the  effort  to  characterize  part-whole  levels.
This  is  a  formal  theory,  abstracted  entirely
from the concerns of practicing scientists. This
means  that  there  are  constraints  in  the  sci-
entific  conception  of  parts  and  wholes  that
classical mereology need not honor. First, the
levels that Churchland and Wimsatt describe
are  space-,  structure-,  and  time-involving  in
ways  that  classical  mereology  need  not  be.
The set of integers is  part of the set of real
numbers, and “Consider the Lobster” is part
of Wallace’s corpus, but not in the same way
that  the  glutamate  receptor  is  part  of  the
chemical  synapse.  The  glutamate  receptor
takes  up  part  of  the  space  occupied  by  the
synapse as a whole. Its opening is part of the
extended process by which neurons communic-
ate. None of this is expressed or intended to
be expressed in the generic part-whole relation
of classical mereology.14
14 Marr’s levels are not space-involving in this way. The algorithm is not loc-
ated within the computation, it is not a substage of the computation, and it
is not organized together with other parts in the service of the computation.
Second, although reflexivity is involved in
certain theoretical applications of mereology, it
has  no  application  in  thinking  about  such
space-involving levels. It does no justice to the
biological  concept  to assert  that  every hippo-
campus is a part of itself. If levels are defined as
a relationship between a part and a whole, and
everything is a part of itself, then everything is
at both higher and lower levels than itself. The
parts surely must be proper parts.15 
Third, it has been noted that the transit-
ivity  axiom often  fails  to  apply  to  functional
parts of the sort that populate physiological and
biological theories (Varzi 2014). Eric is part of
the championship pool  team, and Eric’s  locks
are part of Eric, but his locks are not part of
the team. However, if one requires of a part (en-
tity, property, or activity) that it must be relev-
ant to the property or behavior of the whole,
then one can retain the transitivity of this rela-
tion, at least in many contexts.  If we ask not
about Eric, but about the motion of his arm as
he wields his cue, then his locks are clearly not
relevant  while  the  muscles  gliding  his  arm
steadily  forward  are relevant.  So  too  are,  in
some  sense,  the  molecules  transmitted  across
the  neuromuscular  junction  during  his  back-
stroke. When what counts as a part is filtered
in each iteration by explanatory relevance rela-
tions  (they  are  not  mere  spatial  or  temporal
parts  but  working  parts—parts  that  are  in-
volved in, contribute to, or make a difference to
the property or activity of the whole), then the
relationship is, in fact, transitive. The appear-
ance of a failure of transitivity in functional sys-
tems trades, it seems, on failing to relativize the
decomposition into parts by a highest-level tar-
get  (explanandum)  phenomenon;  not  all  the
spatiotemporal parts of an object or process are
relevant to everything it does. It is only relative
to  a  highest-level  activity  or  property  of  the
hierarchy  under  consideration  that  the  lower
level parts are visible as components—as work-
ing  parts  in  the  mechanism.  If  we  think  not
about the team, Eric, and his locks, but rather
15 This  is  not  a  big  departure  from  classical  mereology;  one  could
simply restrict one’s attention to proper parts. But the point under-
scores the fact that classical mereology was not developed with an
eye  toward  understanding  the  sense  in  which  pyramidal  cells  are
parts of the hippocampus. 
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about the victory, the shot,  and the muscular
contraction,  matters seem different.16 The con-
traction contributes to the shot, which contrib-
utes to the victory. The locks will not appear in
this hierarchy, but the relevant parts will.17 
The extensionality theorem holds that no
two  distinct  objects  share  all  and  only  their
proper parts. A hippocampus and a bust of the
Dalai Lama formed out of the same pyramidal
cells, granule cells, etc. that compose the hippo-
campus  are,  according  to  classical  mereology,
one and the same object. But in biological sys-
tems,  the organization of  components is  often
(perhaps always) relevant to the properties and
activities of the whole. Again, parts appear as
parts only relative to a decomposition framed
by reference to some highest-level property or
activity. This is Kauffman’s point, enshrined in
Glennan’s law: a mechanism is always a mech-
anism of a given phenomenon (Kauffman 1971;
Glennan 1996). Thus Kauffman:
A view of what the system is doing sets
the explanandum and also supplies criteria
by which to decide whether or not a pro-
posed portion of the system with some of
its  causal  consequences  is  to  count  as  a
part and process of the system. Specific-
ally, a proposed part will count as a part
of the system if it, together with some of
its  causal  consequences,  will  fit  together
with  the  other  proposed  parts  and  pro-
cesses to cause the system to behave as de-
scribed. (1971, p. 260)
The more general point is that there is an ap-
plication  of  the  levels  metaphor  that  is  not
merely a part-whole relationship as specified in
classical mereology, but one in which the parts
are  relevant  (explanatorily  and  constitutively)
to some property or activity of the whole. 
One can make a similar point with respect
to the summation axiom. This theorem allows
16 Clearly Eric’s muscles are not part of the team, but this reflects only
the fact that teams can have only certain kinds of part as members.
If we look rather at an activity of the whole and ask what contrib-
utes to that, a different picture emerges. 
17 Specific details about lower-level parts might be screened off in cases
of multiple realization. Specific details about the parts might not be
relevant. In that case, it would appear one must appeal to more ab-
stract properties of the parts. 
one  to  form  arbitrarily  many  gerrymandered
wholes out of disparate and unconnected parts
with no spatial, temporal, causal, or functional
unity. Lewis (1991) calls this “unrestricted com-
position”: whenever there are some things, there
is also a fusion of those things. The Yankees’s
starting rotation and the now disparate parts of
my mother’s old Chevy Vega together form a
whole.  This  way of  thinking  about parts  and
wholes has little or no application in biology be-
cause such gerrymandered wholes don’t do any-
thing interesting (though such wholes will have
aggregate properties  of  the  sort  discussed  be-
low). The whole in such gerrymandered collec-
tions  typically  doesn’t  play  any  explanatory
role. And what goes for wholes goes for parts as
well.  According  to  this  classical  picture,  it  is
perfectly  legitimate  to  claim  that  my  dog,
Spike,  has  four  parts:  a  front  quarter,  a
hindquarter, and two midsections of approxim-
ately equal length. There is nothing to prevent
this way of talking; but the parts revealed in
this  decomposition  do  not  cut  Spike  at  his
joints. The biological decomposition finds joints
at  causal  interfaces,  and  identifies  parts  with
more or less isolable (nearly decomposable) sub-
systems (Simon 1962) that contribute to the be-
havior of the whole. 
In short, many of the ideas central to clas-
sical mereology must be amended or restricted
if they are to apply to the part-whole levels dis-
tinctive of biology, neuroscience, and the special
sciences  generally.  At  least  some of  the  work
can be done by restricting the part-whole rela-
tion by a relevance condition on biological part-
hood:  all  the  lower-level  properties,  activities,
and organizational features of the parts are rel-
evant to—contribute to— the property or activ-
ity of the whole.
6.3 Levels of organization: Aggregates 
and mechanisms
So let us focus on an application of the levels
metaphor that  is  a  part-whole relation  and a
(constitutive) relevance relation. I will not dwell
here on the appropriate notion of relevance (see
Craver 2007, see also  Harinen 2014). For now,
we can work with the idea that each part in
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such a hierarchy (in addition to being spatially
and/or temporally contained within the whole)
plays a necessary but insufficient role within a
collection  of  parts  that  are  jointly  sufficient
(but possibly redundant) for a given explanan-
dum phenomenon (Couch 2011). That is, relev-
ant parts might usefully be thought of as con-
stitutive insufficient,  but necessary part of  an
unnecessary but sufficient condition (I) for the
behavior of the mechanism as a whole (Mackie
1973).18
Again  following  Wimsatt (1997),  we can
distinguish two ways that spatiotemporal parts
contribute to a property or activity of a whole:
aggregation and  organization.  An  aggregate
property is literally a sum of the properties or
activities  of  the  parts.  The  current  flowing
through an ion channel, for example, is a sum of
the charges carried by individual ions. The con-
centration of a volume of a fluid is a sum of the
number  of  particles  in  that  unit  volume.  Ag-
gregative  properties  change  linearly  with  the
addition and removal of parts. And aggregative
properties do not change as the parts are inter-
substituted with one another. Some properties
of the hippocampus, such as its mass, remain
the same when the cellular constituents of the
hippocampus are reorganized to represent  His
Holiness. Other properties of the hippocampus,
such  as  its  information  processing  capacities,
are destroyed. For truly aggregative properties,
spatial,  temporal,  and  causal  organization
among the components is irrelevant. 
18 Once we have made this adjustment, the relata in this relevance-
mereology  are  no  longer  objects  but  rather  properties,
activities/processes, or (as is more common in philosophical par-
lance) events.  One  does  not  explain the elephant;  one explains
why the elephant has large ears or how the elephant circulates its
blood. One does not explain gasses; one explains their temperat-
ure and pressure. This point marks a significant departure from
the mereological  views of  levels  discussed above.  Each of those
applications of the levels metaphor focuses on objects or types of
objects (societies, organisms, cells, and so on) as the relata, not
on their  properties,  activities,  and aspects of their organization.
In many cases, the components picked out in a mechanistic de-
composition fail to correspond to paradigmatic objects with clear
spatial  boundaries.  The  synapse,  for  instance,  is  composed  of
part of a presynapatic cell (the axon terminal), part of a post-
synaptic cell (the dendrite or bouton), and a gap between them.
What unifies these items into an object is their organized beha-
vior: the pre-synaptic cell releases transmitters that traverse the
cleft and act on the postsynaptic cell. Synapses are not cells or
parts of cells, nor are they composed of cells. Rather,  they are
objects unified by their relevance to a given actvity of the whole,
such as chemical transmission. 
Aggregates are rare. The masses of the in-
dividual grains in a sand pile do, in fact, de-
pend on the  spatial  distribution  of  the  other
grains (if one takes relativity seriously). What is
presumed to be a homogeneous concentration of
a liquid can in fact have local concentration dif-
ferences depending on how the ions are organ-
ized in different parts of the fluid. In the case of
non-aggregates, the activity or property of the
whole is not a simple sum of the properties of
the individuals. Adding or removing parts (e.g.,
the human heart) can lead to dramatic changes
in how the system (e.g., the body) works. And
rearranging  the  parts  and  their  activities  in
space and time can eliminate the explanandum
phenomenon entirely (as  would happen if  one
randomly swapped parts of the circulatory sys-
tem for one another). This is all true because
spatial,  temporal,  and causal  organization  are
relevant to (make a difference to, partly consti-
tute) the property of the whole. 
I use the term “mechanism” permissively
to describe  non-aggregative  compositional  sys-
tems in which the parts interact and collectively
realize the behavior or property of the whole.
Mechanisms  are  by  definition  more  than  the
sums of their parts: they have properties their
parts do not have, and they engage in activities
that  their  parts  cannot  accomplish  on  their
own. 
Most mechanisms with which I am famil-
iar involve myriad part-whole relations, some of
which are more aggregative in nature, and some
of which are less so. Many things brains do, for
example, involve the flux of ions across a mem-
brane,  which flux is  closer  to  the aggregative
than the mechanistic end of the organizational
spectrum. Other things brains do (such as the
developing grid  cells  in the entorhinal cortex)
require precisely organized relations among the
activities of cells in and around the entorhinal
cortex.  This organizational spectrum from ag-
gregate  to  mechanism covers  all  the  relations
that go into levels of organization, the superor-
dinate class.19 
In  levels  of  mechanisms,  the  relata  are
some activity or property of a mechanism as a
19 Levy (2013) calls attention to the fact that biological systems typic-
ally involve both aggregation and organization. 
Craver, C. F. (2015). Levels.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 8(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570498 16 | 26
www.open-mind.net
whole,20 and the activities, properties, or organ-
izational features of its components (its relevant
parts and organization). Some component, X’s
-ing, is at a lower mechanistic level than S’sφ
-ing if and only if X’s -ing is a component inψ φ
S’s -ing, that is, if and only if X’s -ing is aψ φ
relevant  spatiotemporal  part  of  S’s  -ing.  Inψ
levels of mechanisms (as opposed to aggregates)
lower-level  components  are  organized  together
to make up some behavior or property of the
whole; in aggregates, the properties of the parts
are summed. 
Levels of mechanisms are represented in
Figure  4. At the top is the activity of  some
mechanism as a whole (S’s -ing). S’s -ing isψ ψ
a  behaving  mechanism.  Although  one  can
speak of the mechanism and its activity separ-
ately  (as  when  a  mechanism stands  inactive
but ready to act), such separation in thought
is  artificial.  Even  the  static  mechanism  is
defined and sub-divided by reference to what
it  does.   is  the  topping-off  activity  of  theψ
mechanism for  which all  lower-level  compon-
ents are relevant. It can be idealized as an in-
put-ouput relation, though this is an impover-
ished  way  of  understanding  phenomena  (see
Craver 2007). One level down are the activit-
ies  and  components,  the  X’s  -ing,  whichφ
compose and are organized together to consti-
tute S’s -ing.ψ 21 Below that is another itera-
tion of levels: the -ings of Ps organized suchρ
that one of the Xs s as it does. By organizaφ -
tion, I mean that the parts have spatial (e.g.,
location,  size,  shape,  and  motion),  temporal
(e.g.,  order,  rate,  and  duration),  and  active
(e.g., feedback or other motifs of organization;
20 These might be understood as the obtaining of a property or the un-
folding of a process over time. What counts as a static property of-
ten depends on one’s temporal resolution.
21 I have not always chosen my language in a way that comports with
common usage among metaphysicians, preferring to follow  Salmon
(1984). In this paper, I have tried to make it clear that I am inter-
ested in components. Components, as the name suggests, compose
behavior of the higher-level mechanism when organized together. All
of the component entities and activities organized together, it now
seems  appropriate  to  say,  jointly  constitute  the  behavior  of  the
whole. That is, I am now using componency to talk about relation-
ships between wholes and parts, and I am using “constitution” to
talk about levels of micro-realization. I am not especially interested
in the relationship between statues and lumps of clay. I am inter-
ested in how parts are organized and interact so that together they
exhibit higher-level behaviors. I know of no metaphysician who has
developed an adequate notion to express this, so perhaps I will be
forgiven for appropriating these words for new uses.
see  Levy &  Bechtel 2014) relations with one
another  by  which  they  work  together  to  do
something  they  cannot  do  on  their  own.  As
noted above, the relationship between levels is
a  part-whole  relationship  filtered  further  by
constitutive  relevance  (Craver 2005;  Harinen
forthcoming).  In  levels  of  mechanisms,  parts
are made into higher-level components by be-
ing  organized  spatially,  temporally,  and  act-
ively into something. In more aggregate com-
positional relationships, they are summed into
higher levels. 
Contemporary  theories  of  learning  and
memory  provide  a  compelling  example  of
levels  of  mechanisms  (see  Craver &  Darden
2001; Craver 2002). The top level is a mechan-
ism as a whole engaged in a spatial memory
task,  such  as  learning  to  run  efficiently
through  a  maze.  One  component  in  that
mechanism, and so one level down in this de-
scription, is the hippocampus, a region of the
brain  thought  to  form a  “map” of  locations
and orientations within the maze. The capa-
city of the hippocampus to acquire such an in-
ternal map of local spaces is thought to be ex-
plained,  in  part,  by  changes  in  synapses
between pyramidal cells, specifically by a pro-
cess known as Long-Term Potentiation (LTP).
And it is now known that n-methyl d-aspart-
ate  (NMDA) receptors  (n-methyl  d-aspartate
is a pharmacological agonist that binds these
receptors  preferentially),  contribute  to  LTP.
This story could continue downward, looking
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into  aspects  of  protein  chemistry  and  the
structural changes thought to underlie channel
functioning. 
6.3.1 Levels of mechanisms are local
Levels of mechanisms are of entirely local sig-
nificance.  The  levels  in  our  example  are
defined  by  reference  to  a  topping-off  point,
spatial memory, contribution to which determ-
ines whether or not a spatiotemporal part of
the system is in fact relevant—whether it is a
component  in  the  mechanism  for  S’s  ψ-ing.
The hierarchy  in  Figure  4 and  the  levels  of
spatial memory as I have described them fol-
low only a single (local) strand of embedding:
from  the  behavior  of  the  mechanism  as  a
whole, to the behaviors of its components, on
to the behaviors of  one of these components,
and so on.
Levels  of  mechanisms,  like  part-whole
levels generally, are not monolithic divisions in
the furniture of the world. Levels of mechanisms
are defined only within a given part-whole hier-
archy. There are different levels of mechanisms
in the spatial memory system, in the circulatory
system, in the osmoregulatory system, and in
the visual system; the levels in each need not
map onto one another. How many levels there
are, and which levels are included, must be de-
termined on a case-by-case basis by discovering
which sorts of components are explanatorily rel-
evant for a given phenomenon. Levels of mech-
anisms cannot be read off a menu of levels in
advance.
If we apply the levels metaphor only loc-
ally, then it makes no sense to ask whether the
hippocampus is at a higher or lower level than
the nephra in the kidney. The nephra are not
part of the hippocampus, and they are not rel-
evant  to  the  functioning  of  the hippocampus.
Neither  similarities  of  size  nor  similarities  in
kinds of part are definitive of levels of mechan-
isms. Rather, levels of mechanisms are defined
relative to one another within a hierarchically
organized mechanism. 
The idea that levels of mechanisms retain
some hint of the layer-cake model can sneak its
way back into one’s application of the metaphor
if  one slides  unknowingly between tokens and
types of parts and wholes. Compare the follow-
ing three sentences:
a) This  pyramidal  cell  is  at  a  lower  level  of
mechanisms than this hippocampus.
b) Pyramidal cells are at a lower level of mech-
anisms than hippocampi.
c) Cells are at a lower level of mechanisms than
organs.
Statement (a) expresses a mechanistic notion of
levels: a particular pyramidal cell is a compon-
ent  of  a  particular  hippocampal  mechanism.
This statement is true if the cell is a component
in a mechanism for a given activity in which the
hippocampus is  engaged. It  might  be,  for ex-
ample, that a given pyramidal cell is a compon-
ent in some hippocampal mechanisms but not
others; if so, it is at a lower level to some hippo-
campal activities and not others. 
Wimsatt describes the compositional re-
lationship  between  levels  as  a  relationship
between  types.  He  writes:  “Intuitively,  one
thing is at a higher level than something else
if  things  of  the  first  type  are  composed  of
things of the second type” (Wimsatt 1976, p.
215).  This  is  a  departure  from  the  idea  of
levels  of  mechanisms and one that  threatens
to  reinstate  something  like  the  Oppenheim
and  Putnam  hierarchy.  Pyramidal  cells  are
found  outside  the  hippocampus,  and  those
pyramidal cells are not parts in hippocampal
mechanisms; they are not at a lower level of
mechansitic  organization.  Likewise,  both  the
hippocampus and the kidney are composed of
cells; organs tend to be composed of cells. But
the  cells  in  the  hippocampus  are  not  at  a
lower mechanistic  level than kidneys because
they  do  not  contribute  to  kidney  function.
The slide from sentences such as (a) to sen-
tences such as (b) and (c) is a slide back to-
ward the layer-cake model. Of course, scient-
ists typically deal with types. But as I suggest
above, this is a generalization over a relation-
ship  between tokens.  The  correct  generaliza-
tion is that the cells that compose hippocam-
puses are at a lower level than the hippocam-
puses they compose.
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This is significant for two reasons. First,
it  helps  to  show  that  many  objections  to
thinking about neuroscience and other special
sciences in terms of levels simply do not apply
to this restricted application of the metaphor.
If  one  thinks,  with  Wimsatt,  me,  and prob-
ably  Oppenheim and  Putnam,  that  the  Op-
penheim and Putnam layer cake is an overly
simplistic representation of the diverse ontolo-
gical  structures  one  finds  in  the  special  sci-
ences—that  things  like  occular  dominance
columns  and  synapses  don’t  readily  fit  that
picture—one  can nonetheless  retain  the  idea
that  mechanisms  are  susceptible  to  multiple
nested decompositions. These are different ap-
plications  of  the  levels  metaphor.  Secondly,
and perhaps more importantly, the idea that
levels are local significantly shifts the reduc-
tionist  world-view for  which  Oppenheim and
Putnam developed their ontology of levels. If
one thinks of  levels  as  levels  of  organization
(as levels of mechanism and levels of aggrega-
tion), then it is inaccurate to think of reduc-
tion as involving relationships among theories
developed to describe the items at a particular
monolithic level. If reduction is simply a mat-
ter of explaining a higher-level phenomenon in
terms of  the organized  activities  of  compon-
ents, then reduction is still  possible within a
mechanistic  world-picture,  but  it  will  be
achieved  not  through  grand  reductions  of
overarching theories, but rather through piece-
meal  explanatory  achievements  for  specific
phenomena.  Visions  of  the  unity  of  science
through interlevel  reduction have to be revi-
sioned  not  as  grand  unifications  across  the
whole of science but rather as local explanat-
ory successes. Such local explanations will, in
fact, integrate findings from different sciences
and  bring  different  theoretical  vocabularies
into conversation with one another (see Craver
2005; Craver & Darden 2001), but it only de-
ceptively resembles the layer cake that Oppen-
heim and Putnam sketched as a working hy-
pothesis.22
22 Nothing in this picture is meant to deny token identity between the be-
havior of a mechanism as a whole and the organized behavior of its
parts. Because there are some conceptual difficulties that stand in the
way of speaking meaningfully about token identities between levels, I
have written with fewer commitments about constitution.
6.3.2 Placement is weak and derivative in 
levels of mechanisms
One consequence of the mechanistic application
of the levels metaphor is that there is no unique
answer to the question of when two items are at
the same mechanistic level. Only a partial an-
swer is avialable: X’s -ing and S’s -ing are atφ ψ
the same level of mechanisms only if X’s -ingφ
and  S’s  -ing  are  components  in  the  sameψ
mechanism, X’s -ing is not a component in S’sφ
-ing, and S’s -ing is not a component in X’sψ ψ
-ing.φ 23 Unlike  size  levels  or  levels  defined  in
terms of the types of objects found at a given
level,  levels  of  mechanisms are defined funda-
mentally by the relations question: by the com-
ponency relationship between things at higher
and lower levels. If two things are not related as
part to whole, they are not at different levels,
and so, if they are in the same mechanism, they
are, in this very weak sense, at the same level.
But this is just to say that sameness of level has
no  significance  within  this  application  of  the
metaphor.24
If  one  thinks  of  levels  of  organization  as
levels  of  aggregates  and  levels  of  mechanisms,
then  spatial  containment  and  size  relations
between levels follow as an accidental consequence
of the componency relation. The pyramidal cells
are contained within the hippocampus, which is
contained within the spatial memory system. The
activities of these entities are also related as tem-
poral part to whole: the binding of glutamate is a
23 This has struck some readers as circular because it appears to state
that X and S are at the same level if they are not at different levels.
Appearances  to  the  contrary,  this  is  not  circular.  I  have  defined
“same level” in terms of the notion of “different level” and the latter
is defined in terms of componency relations. The appearance of cir-
cularity, I believe, results from the fact that most people assume that
the notion of “same level” must be primitive relative to the notion of
“different level,” and I have reversed that assumed order.
24 Another way to see that levels of mechanisms do not answer the
placement question is to recognize an apparent failure of transit-
ivity. Suppose X1 and X2 are components in the same mechan-
ism, that neither is a component in the other, and that the beha-
vior of X2 can be decomposed into a set of interacting compon-
ents, including P1. X1 would, according to this account, be “at
the same level” as both X2 and P1 even though X2 and P1 are at
different  levels  from one another.  This  problem, first  raised by
Lindley Darden (personal  communication),  is  only a problem if
one demands that there must be a unique answer to the place-
ment question for an account of mechanistic levels. My argument
against the notion of monolithic  levels turns  on the absence of
any good principle  for  stretching  the ideal  of  levels  beyond its
local context. 
Craver, C. F. (2015). Levels.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 8(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570498 19 | 26
www.open-mind.net
temporal component in the activity of the NMDA
receptor. The objects at lower levels are smaller
than (or at least no larger than) the whole, giving
the hierarchy a derivative size ordering. Relations
of size, rather than defining what it is for an item
to be at a level (the placement question), are de-
rivative from the more fundamental relationship
between levels  (the relations question):  namely,
the relationship between a mechanism and a com-
ponent. 
6.3.3 Emergence and levels of 
mechanisms 
Mechanisms  do  things  that  their  components
taken individually cannot. This marks a sharp
distinction  between  levels  of  mechanisms  and
levels of realization. Kim says this point is “ob-
vious but important”:
This  table  has a mass  of  ten kilograms,
and this property, that of having a mass of
ten kilograms, represents a well-defined set
of causal powers. But no micro-constituent
of this table, none of its proper parts, has
this property or the causal powers it rep-
resents. H2O molecules have causal powers
that no oxygen and hydrogen atoms have.
A  neural  assembly  consisting  of  many
thousands of neurons will have properties
whose causal powers go beyond the causal
powers of the properties of its constituent
neurons, or subassemblies, and human be-
ings have causal powers that none of our
individual organs have. Clearly then mac-
roproperties can, and in general do, have
their  own causal  powers,  powers that  go
beyond the causal powers of their micro-
constituents. (Kim 1998, p. 85)
Through  aggregation  or  organization,  wholes
have causal powers that their parts individually
do not  have.  An activity at  a  higher  level  of
mechanistic organization is quite literally more
than the sum of its parts. It is not an aggregate.
The addition and removal of parts leads to non-
linear changes in the behavior of the mechanism
as a whole. It matters how the parts are organ-
ized; it  is  in virtue of  their  organization that
they have properties that go beyond the proper-
ties  of  the  individual  parts  (Wimsatt 1996).
This feature of levels of mechanisms is so obvi-
ous, so prosaic, and so banal as to be hardly
worth mentioning.  No fancy complexity is  re-
quired: two toothpicks stacked perpendicular to
one another have the mechanistically emergent
capacity to act as a lever or catapult; neither
toothpick can do so on its own. 
Of course, most mechanisms in biology are
substantially more complicated than that. They
have  many  more  parts.  Those  parts  interact
with one another with bewildering complexity.
Often they contain feedback relations that in-
troduce  nonlinear  interactions  into  the  opera-
tion of the mechanism itself. The mechanisms of
LTP, for example, have yet to yield their secrets
completely  despite  the  dedicated  attention  of
thousands of researchers over forty-odd years. A
glance at any recent textbook is enough to con-
vince one that LTP involves myriad intracellu-
lar reactions,  protein synthesis,  structural fea-
tures  of  dendritic  spines,  changes  to  vesicular
release, and retrograde transmission with nitric
oxide. The mechanism involves so many parts
and interactions that it would be useless, if not
impossible, to represent them all in a visual dia-
gram. Keeping track of how they all work to-
gether would require a very complicated compu-
tational model of some sort that has yet to be
developed. As mechanisms get this complicated,
we reach the limits of our ability to predict how
the behavior  of  the  whole  will  change  as the
parts change. Any change introduced to a part
has so many ramifications that it is difficult or
impossible for creatures like us to keep track of
them all.  This is  an interesting fact about us
and the  limits  of  our  cognitive  and modeling
prowess.  But, ontologically,  it is the same old
banal fact about the importance of organization
in  mechanisms.  We have  added  only  that  we
have difficulty keeping track of it all.
Likewise,  a common scientific complaint
against  reductionistic  research  programs  in
biology and neuroscience is that one can make
only limited progress by studying the parts of
mechanisms  in  isolation  from  one  another.25
25 This  idea of reduction is  not the standard notion of theory
reduction  but  something  closer  to  what  Eric  Kandel  means
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We can study LTP in cells grown in a culture,
and we can study hippocampal computations
in a razor-thin hippocampal slice, and we can
study spatial learning in highly contrived en-
vironmental settings such as a large pool filled
with  milky  water  (the  Morris  water  maze).
Such reductionist practices are absolutely es-
sential  to  progress  in  the  sciences.  Nonethe-
less, one engaged in such practices must (and
typically does) bear in mind that the behavior
of  the  part  when  it  is  isolated  for  experi-
mental purposes might be very different from
the  behavior  the  part  exhibits  when  it  is
working  in  the  context  of  a  mechanism.
Causal  interactions  with  other  parts  of  the
mechanism and background conditions “in the
wild”  might  lead  to  behaviors  that  would
never be discovered in such simplified prepara-
tions.  This  is  an  extremely  important  point
about reductionist research programs (Bechtel
& Richardson 1993), and one might choose to
describe  this  well-known  difficulty  with  the
language of emergence. But this is just to say
that one cannot truly understand how a mech-
anism works until one understands how all its
parts  are  organized  together  and working  in
the  relevant  conditions,  and  this  we  have
already said repeatedly. 
I emphasize the banality of these observa-
tions  to  stress  that  many  of  the  things  one
wants  to  say  about  organization  in  biological
systems can be said within the mechanistic ap-
plication of the levels metaphor without intro-
ducing anything that is metaphysically novel or
suspect. As the complexity of a mechanism in-
creases, the epistemic challenges we face in dis-
covering and modeling it increase as well, but
this is of no significance for the ontic structures
—the entities, activities, and organizational fea-
tures that exist in the world.
Not  so  for  spooky  emergence.  Spooky
emergence is spooky precisely because it is com-
mited to the existence of higher-level properties
that have no explanation in terms of the parts,
activities, and organizational features of the sys-
tem in the relevant conditions. Levels of mech-
by  the  term:  choosing  to  study  complex  phenomena  in  ex -
tremely simple systems. We might call  this experimental  re-
ductionism.
anisms are levels of ontic mechanistic explana-
tion (Craver 2014): they are defined in terms of
componency and constitutive explanatory relev-
ance. If that explanatory relationship is severed,
then the sense in which emergent properties are
at a “higher level” must be altogether different
than the compositional notion of levels in levels
of mechanisms. If one imagines that atoms com-
pose molecules, which are organized into cells,
which are linked into networks from which men-
tal  properties  spookily emerge,  the first  three
steps are upward steps in a hierarchy of levels of
mechanisms, but the last is not. The ability of
organization to elicit novel causal powers (that
is, nonaggregative behaviors and properties) is
unmysterious  both  in  scientific  common sense
and  common  sense  proper  (Van  Gulick 1993;
Kim 1998). Appeal to strong or spooky emer-
gence,  on  the  other  hand,  justifiably  arouses
suspicion. Indeed, it is unclear why properties
that  emerge  in  a  spooky  fashion  should  be
thought  of  as  higher-level  at  all.  Perhaps  the
very idea of spooky emergence is incoherent.
6.3.4 Mechanistic levels are not causally 
related to one another
As  with  levels  of  realization,  many  common
assumptions  about  the  nature  of  causation
would  appear  to  make  causal  relations
between mechanistic parts and the properties
or behaviors of wholes suspect. Items at differ-
ent levels of aggregation and at different levels
of mechanisms are intimate with one another
in much the same way that items at different
levels of realization are intimate. Lewis is ex-
plicit. If C causes E:
C and E must be distinct events [if they
are  to  be  causally  related]—and  distinct
not only in the sense of  nonidentity but
also in the sense of nonoverlap and non-
implication.  It  won’t  do to say that  my
speaking this sentence causes my speaking
this  sentence;  or  that  my  speaking  the
whole of  it  causes  my speaking the first
half of it; or that my speaking causes my
speaking  it  loudly,  or  vice  versa.  (Lewis
2000, p. 78)
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The relevant kind of intimacy for levels of mech-
anisms is overlap between token events or pro-
cesses. The relationship between LTP and the
opening of NMDA receptors during LTP induc-
tion  is  directly  analogous  to  the  relationship
between speaking the whole of a sentence and
speaking its first half. The induction of LTP is
partly constituted by the opening of the NMDA
receptor. The would-be cause in this top-down
causal claim already contains the would-be ef-
fect within it. There is nothing additional to be
produced in the effect; the occurrence of the ef-
fect includes the occurrence of the cause.
What about the bottom-up case? We might
say that the spark plugs cause the engine to run,
all the while acknowledging that the sparking of
spark plugs is part of the operation of the engine.
The naturalness of this locution is at least partly
due to an ambiguity in the way we commonly de-
scribe the behavior of a mechanism as a whole.
Sometimes we describe it as an activity or process
that starts with the mechanism’s setup conditions
and  ends  with  its  termination  conditions
(Machamer et al. 2000). Thus we might describe
Long-Term Potentiation as a process26 or activity
beginning  with  a  rapid  and  repeated  stimulus
(called a tetanus) to the presynaptic neuron and
ending  with  enhanced  transmission  across  the
synapse. Other times we describe the behavior of
the mechanism as a whole, the phenomenon, as
the product of that process (or one of its termina-
tion  conditions).  Thus  we  might  say  that  the
mechanism of Long-Term Potentiation produces
a potentiated synapse. This way of speaking leads
us to think in terms of the antecedent causes of
potentiation: the tetanus is a distal cause, and the
subsequent changes in the NMDA receptor are
more proximal. If we think about the behavior of
the mechanism in the second way, as a product, it
is natural to think of the opening of the NMDA
receptor as a cause of the synapses being potenti-
ated (and indeed it is). But if we think about the
behavior of the mechanism in the first way, as an
input-output  relation  starting  with  the  tetanus
and ending with a potentiated synapse, then it is
wrong to think of the tetanus or the opening of
the  NMDA receptor  as  a  cause  of  that.  The
26 Not in the Salmon (1984) sense, but in the colloquial sense of an un-
folding sequence of states and activities.
NMDA receptor is a part of that causal process.
These are two equally acceptable ways of describ-
ing the relationship between a mechanism and a
phenomenon; they are easily translated into one
another. However, if one is careless, these ways of
speaking and writing invite equivocation of pre-
cisely  the  sort  that  we  are  struggling  here  to
avoid.
Suppose we represent the input-output rela-
tionship constituting LTP as in the top of Figure
5, where I is a tetanus and O is a stable, potenti-
ated synapse. Beneath this abstract I-O relation
is a more detailed description of the intermediate
stages in this mechanism: the tetanus excites the
postsynaptic  cell  (A)  which  depolarizes  it  (B),
causes NMDA receptors to open (C), and so on.
(Nothing turns on the fact that I’ve idealized this
mechanism as a single,  step-wise causal  chain.)
Now, suppose we intervene to open the NMDA
receptors directly and thereby potentiate the syn-
apse (as shown in the third line). We might say
that this intervention induced LTP; but when we
say  this,  we  mean  that  it  produces  the  end
product of the mechanism (it potentiates the syn-
apse). We cannot coherently assert that it causes
the process as depicted in the first two lines. This
is for the simple reason that the process in the
first two lines includes stages I, A, and B, and
these are absent in the causal sequence represen-
ted in the third line. At most we can say the in-
tervention caused the last half of the process. The
NMDA receptor is not a cause of the process of
LTP; it is a component of that process.27 
27 This case is easiest to make for interventions that start the process mid-
way. If an intervention, instead, were to augment C and thereby produce
a more potentiated synapse than one would otherwise have had, then
causal  language  would  appear  to  be  appropriate.  The  intervention
changes, makes a difference to,  the  input-output relationship.  These
considerations  generalize  naturally  to  claims  about  types  of
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6.4 Levels of mechanisms in relation to 
other kinds of levels
This application of the levels metaphor, accord-
ing to which levels of organization are under-
stood  in  terms  of  levels  of  aggregation  and
levels of mechanisms, thus offers a no-nonsense,
ontological picture that comports well with the
kinds  of  explanatory  structure  one  finds  in
neuroscience  and  throughout  the  special  sci-
ences generally. 
This  view  eschews  the  idea  that  levels
are monolithic strata in the structure of  the
universe,  with  proprietary  causal  laws  and
forces  (contra  the  view  in  Wimsatt,  Oppen-
heim,  and Putnam).  Likewise,  it  allows  that
items at higher levels have causal powers that
things at  lower levels  do not,  in  contrast  to
levels of realization. Single sciences and theor-
ies  might  investigate  phenomena  at  many
levels of organization, and an item located at
one  level  in  such  a  compositional  hierarchy
might  be  studied  by  many  sciences  and  de-
scribed in many theories.  Things at different
levels of organization (aggregation and mech-
anism) do not causally interact with one an-
other, though we might find more complicated
ways  of  describing  how  these  items  depend
upon  one  another  (see  Craver &  Bechtel
2007). As a result, if we think about the world
in terms of  levels of  organization, we should
not  be tempted into thinking  that  things  at
higher  levels  control  or  dominate  things  at
lower levels.  Levels  of  organization  are,  in  a
sense, levels of explanation, given that explan-
ations for different topping off phenomena will
often  decompose  the  system  into  altogether
different parts within parts. It might be diffi-
cult  to  discern  such levels  in  scientific  prac-
tice,  and  the  organization  of  components
might be very complex, but nothing emerges
from levels of mechanisms except in the banal
sense that parts organized together do things
that the parts alone cannot. Levels of organiz-
mechanistic parts and wholes. Separately: When we describe this
relation as a kind of production, levels show up as intermediate
causes.  Perhaps  the  temptation  to  speak  of  levels  at  all  is
lessened  if  one  maintains  that  perspective.  But  this  is  not  a
change in what is being said so much as a change in how it is be -
ing said.
ation, in other words, seem to capture many
of the intuitions that accompany the idea that
the world is organized into levels but without
many of  the  objectionable  elements  of  other
applications of the levels metaphor. The fact
that  the  levels  metaphor  is  often  used  care-
lessly and deployed in ways that violate com-
mon sense and metaphysical ideas about the
structure of the world should not lead one to
abandon the metaphor entirely. As we’ve seen,
it can be given a relatively precise and meta-
physically  unobjectionable  formulation  that,
in addition, fits the multilevel structures that
the most advanced special sciences seem to be
discovering. 
7 Conclusion
Despite the ubiquity of levels talk in contem-
porary science and philosophy, very little has
been done to clarify the notion. Here I defend
a  kind  of  descriptive  pluralism  about  the
levels metaphor: it is applied usefully in many
contexts to describe different relata, different
relations, and different senses in which items
might be located at a given level. Because the
levels  metaphor  is  so  ubiquitous  and  so
promiscuously  applied,  some  vigilance  is  re-
quired to keep the applications distinct from
one another. I have discussed only a few ap-
plications: levels of science, theory, realization,
size,  mereology, aggregation, and mechanism.
Even  in  these  few  key  examples,  we  have
found good reason to remain vigilant. The im-
plications  of  the  levels  metaphor  in  one  ap-
plication only occasionally transfer  when the
metaphor is applied differently. 
I have also suggested that levels of mech-
anisms (or,  more generally,  levels  of  organiza-
tion) are especially important to the explanat-
ory  structure  of  neuroscience  and  the  special
sciences generally. If one thinks of levels in this
way, one can easily see why interlevel causation
should seem so problematic (indeed, it is prob-
lematic), one is free to jettison Oppenheim and
Putnam’s  idea  of  monolithic  levels  of  nature,
and one can see room in the causal structure of
the  world  for  the existence  and legitimacy of
higher-level  causes  and explanations.  Whether
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the idea of levels of mechanisms truly pays off
in such useful ways remains to be seen. I merely
hope to have preserved the metaphor, and its
application to mechanisms, in the face of prob-
lems it inherits only through equivocation. 
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